Labor Case Law: The deviation is corrected. But who guarantees legal predictibility (certainty)?
New case law doctrine on the retention of labor documents
The Second Transitory Chamber of Constitutional and Social Law of the Supreme Court, through Labor Cassation No. 3579-2025-La Libertad, has established, as binding case law doctrine, new criteria regarding employers' obligation to retain labor documentation.
The decision starts from a clear premise: there are rules that expressly establish a maximum retention period for certain labor documentation and, therefore, it would not be legally valid to require the employer to keep those documents for a period longer than that provided by law.
In this sense, the Supreme Court has established the following criteria:
- Employers are only required to keep books, payment records, pay slips and labor records of all kinds —including those relating to attendance control and overtime work— for a period of no more than five years.
- When the age of the rights claimed exceeds that period, the burden of proving their existence will fall on the party invoking them.
- If the employer does not produce the corresponding labor documentation, the judge must recognize the rights claimed by the worker for a period of up to five years prior to the date of termination.
- It is not legally possible to require the employer to keep such records for a period longer than that established by law, as this would mean imposing an obligation that the legal system does not contemplate.
The practical importance of the decision can be seen in the case itself. The plaintiff claimed, among other items, payment for overtime, Sundays and holidays for a period between 1996 and 2017. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the recognition of those items could only cover the five years prior to termination, that is, the period between February 1, 2012 and February 1, 2017.
A criterion that corrects course?
This decision is especially relevant because it directly contradicts the criterion recently adopted by the Fourth Transitory Chamber of Constitutional and Social Law in Labor Cassation No. 36773-2023-La Libertad.
In that decision, the Fourth Chamber essentially held that the five-year period provided for document retention is an administrative simplification measure, but does not amount to a kind of evidentiary expiration within labor proceedings. Under that criterion, if the worker provides reasonable evidence of overtime work and the employer does not produce the corresponding records, this omission could be assessed as obstructive conduct within the proceedings.
The Fourth Chamber also considered that administrative simplification rules cannot be interpreted in isolation or used to render ineffective, in practice, the duties of procedural cooperation, the rules on the burden of proof and the consequences of procedural misconduct provided for in the New Labor Procedure Law.
The Second Chamber, on the contrary, has adopted a different and considerably more categorical position. For this Chamber, the rules establishing the document retention period must be applied by the courts, and the employer cannot be required to keep records for a period longer than that expressly provided for by the legal system. The ruling itself even highlights that administrative, inspection, judicial and arbitral bodies must observe the rule set forth in numeral 3.4 of article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 1310.
But what about legal predictability?
The new case law doctrine appears to seek a response to the practice of requiring employers to produce documentation for periods for which the law itself no longer imposes a retention obligation. From that perspective, the criterion established by the Second Chamber provides a clear rule regarding the time limit of that obligation.
However, the problem does not disappear entirely.
The coexistence of different criteria between the Second and Fourth Chambers regarding the same issue creates a scenario that may affect legal predictability. While one position holds that, once the legal retention period has elapsed, the employer cannot be required to produce the documents and no adverse consequences can be drawn from their absence, the other considers that such period does not necessarily eliminate the procedural consequences arising from the failure to produce documents.
And although Labor Cassation No. 3579-2025-La Libertad has been expressly issued as binding case law doctrine for lower courts, the existence of divergent decisions within the Supreme Court itself shows a debate that can hardly be considered closed.
Therefore, it will be important to observe how lower courts apply this new doctrine and, above all, whether the Supreme Court manages to consolidate a uniform criterion on the relationship between legal document retention periods and procedural rules on the burden of proof, cooperation and procedural misconduct.
The deviation seems to have been corrected. The question now is whether, with different criteria coming from the Supreme Court itself, employers will finally be able to count on the legal predictability that this doctrine precisely seeks to reinforce.
Private life ends where occupational risk begins: Supreme Court upholds dismissal for alcohol consumption outside working hours
The Second Transitory Chamber of Constitutional and Social Law of the Supreme Court, through Labor Cassation No. 36529-2023-Lima, addresses a particularly relevant issue for the exercise of the employer's disciplinary power: can conduct carried out outside working hours justify a dismissal?
For the Supreme Court, the answer may be affirmative when such conduct goes beyond the worker's strictly personal sphere and directly affects the fulfillment of their work obligations or safety in the workplace.
What happened?
The case involved a worker who served as a first-class electrician in the electrical maintenance area of a mining unit. According to the facts proven in the proceedings, the worker brought a bottle of pisco into the mining camp and subsequently consumed alcohol while off duty
- In the early hours of January 1, 2019, he was stopped within the camp facilities as he showed visible signs of intoxication.
- The tests carried out determined that, at 3:40 a.m., the worker had 1.31 grams of alcohol per liter of blood.
- However, he was due to start his workday a few hours later, at 7:00 a.m.
The Supreme Court considered it relevant that the worker did not perform just any type of activity, but worked as an electrician in a mining unit, that is, in a context in which safety and risk prevention are especially important. The consumption occurred outside working hours, but its effects did not.
One of the most interesting aspects of the ruling is that the Supreme Court did not limit itself to analyzing the moment at which the worker consumed alcohol. On the contrary, it assessed the consequences that such conduct would have on the future performance of services.
To this end, using as a reference the Widmark Method, a formula used to estimate blood alcohol concentration based on the amount of alcohol ingested, the time elapsed and certain characteristics of the body, the Chamber concluded that the worker would not have eliminated the alcohol from his body before the start of his workday. Thus, it estimated that, at 7:00 a.m., when he was due to start work, he would still have had approximately 0.71 grams of alcohol per liter of blood.
This element was decisive for the Court. Although the alcohol intake occurred outside working hours, its effects directly extended to a workday that was to begin a few hours later and to tasks that, by their very nature, involved significant risk.
The Supreme Court also recalled that, to determine whether there has been a breach of good faith in the employment relationship, it is not necessarily essential to prove specific harm to the employer. What matters is determining whether the conduct attributed to the worker constitutes a breach of his work obligations that breaks the trust placed in him and makes the continuation of the employment relationship unreasonable.
In this case, the Court considered that allowing the worker to start work in those conditions would have increased the risk of incidents or accidents, particularly considering that he worked as an electrician in a mining activity.
Therefore, it concluded that the conduct constituted a serious offense linked to the breach of good faith in the employment relationship and that the sanction of dismissal was reasonable and proportionate. Consequently, it set aside the compensation for arbitrary dismissal that had been granted by the lower courts.
A boundary worth paying attention to:
The relevance of this ruling does not lie simply in stating that alcohol consumption can justify a dismissal. The real contribution of the decision lies in the connection it establishes between conduct carried out outside working hours and its consequences on the future performance of services.
The Supreme Court seems to draw a clear line: conduct that belongs, in principle, to the worker's personal sphere may acquire disciplinary relevance when there is a direct connection between such conduct and the breach of their work obligations, workplace safety or the ability to properly perform their duties.
Of course, this does not mean that any conduct carried out outside working hours may be subject to disciplinary sanction. The analysis must take into account the specific circumstances of the case, the nature of the duties, the level of risk involved and, mainly, the link between the conduct charged and the employment relationship.
The worker's private life is still private. But when the effects of personal conduct enter the workplace and jeopardize safety or the proper performance of duties, the boundary between the personal and the professional may begin to disappear.
LEGAL NOTE
Without clear parameters: The Supreme Court annuls the “economic reasons” criteria for collective dismissals.
The Permanent Chamber of Constitutional and Social Law of the Supreme Court, through Popular Action No. 29537-2023-LIMA, upheld the nullity of article 1 of Supreme Decree No. 013-2014-TR, a rule that established parameters to determine when a company could be in an economic situation justifying the collective termination of employment contracts for economic reasons.
The decision is particularly relevant for employers. The annulled provision established that the economic situation that could justify a collective dismissal arose, among other scenarios, when the company recorded three consecutive quarters of negative operating income or when maintaining the employment of all workers would result in losses.
However, for the majority of the Supreme Court, the Executive Branch went beyond its regulatory power.
The problem: regulating is not creating
The dispute revolved around an apparent gap in the Labor Productivity and Competitiveness Law.
Subparagraph b) of article 46 of the LPCL recognizes economic reasons as an objective cause for the collective termination of employment contracts. However, the rule with the rank of law does not define exactly what is to be understood by “economic reasons”.
Ante esta ausencia de una definición expresa, el Decreto Supremo N.º 013-2014-TR intentó precisar el concepto y estableció parámetros objetivos para identificar una situación económica que pudiera justificar un cese colectivo.
For the Supreme Court, however, this clarification did not constitute a simple regulatory task.
The Chamber considered that, by establishing that economic reasons arose when there were three consecutive quarters of negative operating income or when keeping all workers generated losses, the Executive Branch did not limit itself to developing the law, but introduced a normative definition of the scope of a ground provided for in a rule with the rank of law.
In other words, the Court was clear: regulatory power allows a law to be developed, but not to complete through a regulation what the legislator has not defined.
A legal gap cannot be filled by just any means
One of the most relevant aspects of the ruling is that the Supreme Court expressly acknowledges that the LPCL does not define “economic reasons” as a ground for collective termination.
However, far from considering that this absence empowered the Executive Branch to establish such a definition, the Court concluded that a clarification of this nature had to be made through a rule with the rank of law.
For the Chamber, defining which economic situation allows employment contracts to be collectively terminated involves determining one of the conditions that justify an exceptional form of employment termination. Therefore, such a definition could not be introduced through a supreme decree.
Thus, the ruling reinforces an important limit on regulatory power: a regulation may develop the mechanisms for applying the law, but may not create or redefine the substantive conditions of an institution when these have not been established by the legislator.
And now what happens with “economic reasons”?
The Supreme Court's decision does not eliminate “economic reasons” as an objective ground for the collective termination of employment contracts. It remains provided for in subparagraph b) of article 46 of the LPCL.
What changes is that the parameters that, until now, made it possible to identify when a company was in an economic situation that could justify initiating a collective dismissal procedure disappear.
This once again opens up an area of uncertainty. The LPCL recognizes “economic reasons” as a ground for collective termination, but does not expressly define which situations allow that ground to be considered met. Supreme Decree No. 013-2014-TR sought to fill that gap by establishing specific criteria; however, the Supreme Court has considered that such a definition could not be introduced through a regulatory rule.
Thus, the ruling leaves a particular situation: the ground remains, but the rule establishing how to identify it disappears.
From a practical perspective, this could once again lead to debates about the economic standard that must be proven to support a collective dismissal and about the criteria that the Labor Administrative Authority must consider when assessing this type of procedure.
In this sense, the ruling not only reaffirms the limits of the Executive Branch's regulatory power. It also puts a pending question back on the table: if the law recognizes “economic reasons” as a ground for collective dismissal but does not define its scope, should it be up to the legislator to establish parameters that provide greater predictability to workers, employers and the Labor Administrative Authority itself?
For now, what is certain is that the parameters of three consecutive quarters of negative operating income and of the situation in which maintaining the employment of all workers implies losses are no longer part of the legal system as regulatory criteria for defining the existence of “economic reasons”.
If you have any questions and/or inquiries, contact us:
Gonzalo Ferrer Cárdenas
Socio – Director del Área Laboral
gferrer@dclegal.pe
Paola Che León
Senior Associate
pcheleon@dclegal.pe
Violeta Mena
Associate
vmena@dclegal.pe

